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PENNSYLVANIA'S NEW LONG-ARM STATUTE:
EXTENDED JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute has been
criticized as an ineffective means of obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation.' The argument most frequently advanced was
that the statute, in its original and amended versions, had been so
narrowly constructed that the Pennsylvania courts were unable to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to the fullest extent allowed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This deficiency in the Pennsylvania statute worked a hardship upon its citizens, since they were subject to the expense and
risk of litigating their claims in another jurisdiction.
In an effort to correct this situation, the Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a new long-arm statute. 2 The new statute not
only liberalizes the "doing business" test which has traditionally
determined a foreign corporation's amenability to suit in Pennsylvania but also purports to extend the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
courts over foreign corporations "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States."8 It is the purpose of

this Comment to interpret the provisions of the new statute and to
determine the extent of its jurisdictional reach over foreign corpo-

rations.4
In jurisdictional questions, the law of the forum state, as limited
by the due process clause, determines the amenability of a corporation to suit in that state.5 This analysis of state court jurisdiction
over nonresidents has often been described as a "two-step" test.
First, the state must be empowered by its own statutory authority
to subject the nonresident to suit in its courts. Second, this exer1. See, e.g., Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Co., 208 Pa. Super.
138, 220 A.2d 350 (1966); Comment, InternationalShoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-How About Pennsylvania?, 8 DuQ. L. REV. 319 (1970).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8301-11 (Supp. 1974-75).
3.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(b) (Supp. 1974-75).

4. For a discussion of the former Pennsylvania long-arm statute as
it applied to nonresident individuals, see Comment, The Pennsylvania
Long-Arm: An Analytical Justification, 17 VILL. L. REv. 73 (1971).
5. E.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219, 223
(2d Cir. 1963); Optico Corp. v. Standard Tool Co., 285 F. Supp. 46, 47 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).

cise of jurisdiction must not violate the nonresident's due process
rights. 6 Because the new statute defines the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts as being coterminous with due process, the state has
seemingly extended its powers to the permissible limit. However, it
should be noted that the statute excludes from consideration for
jurisdictional purposes any corporate activity in the area of real estate finance.7 This exclusion acts as a limitation upon the effectiveness of the statute. It reimposes upon Pennsylvania citizens the
hardships of the former statute by creating a somewhat broad exception to the state's jurisdictional powers not demanded by federal
due process requirements.
This Comment will first review the Supreme Court cases which
have dealt with the issue of federal due process. Next, the original
and amended versions of the former Pennsylvania long-arm statute
will be considered together with decisions interpreting them. The
relevant features of the new statute will then be presented. Finally, the extended reach of the new statute will be examined in
the context of the "single act" transactions which will now make a
corporation amenable to suit in Pennsylvania.

I.

Tm LIBERALIZATION OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS
ON STATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER
NONRESIDENTS

Before a state can exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident it is necessary that amenability to suit in that particular
state does not violate the nonresident's due process rights as prescribed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. If the
forum state rendered judgment against a nonresident without the
requisite personal jurisdiction, then this would amount to deprivation of personal property without due process of law.8 It is necessary that the nonresident have some "minimal contacts" or relation
to the forum state before the requirements of due process are satisfied. 9 The determination of the relationship needed to satisfy the
federal due process requirements has generated much of the litigation concerning the limits of state court jurisdiction.
In Pennoyer v. Neff' ° the Supreme Court formulated a rule of
jurisdiction which was based upon the physical power of the forum
state over the defendant.'
It was held that the forum state could
6.

Pulson v. American Rolling Mill, Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir.

1948); Orange-Crush Grapico Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 128 F. Supp.
174, 175 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(c) (Supp. 1974-75).

8. See Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. FORUM 533 (1963).
9. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945).
10.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).

11. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
Power Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Comment,
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not obtain in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident unless he
was personally served within the state or voluntarily appeared
there to defend the suit. 12 However, this jurisdictional rule of
physical power over the defendant could not be applied to corporations because of their special status as legal fictions existing only
in the state of their incorporation. The rule's shortcomings became a
serious problem when national commerce increased and corporations expanded their operations beyond the state of their domicile. 12 The courts responded to this need to make corporations
amenable to state court jurisdiction, within the framework of
Pennoyer, by developing the theories of "presence" and "implied
consent. ' 14 A corporation, although not incorporated in the forum
state, was deemed to have established the "presence" necessary for
jurisdiction if it had conducted business there.' 5 Alternatively, the
corporation was found to have impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of the forum state through the operation of business activities
within the state. 16 These doctrines employed fictional concepts of
corporate presence and consent so that the jurisdictional requirements of Pennoyer could be satisfied.
The landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington 7

rejected the implied consent and presence theories. The Court held
that a Delaware corporation which had sent salesmen into Washington was subject to the jurisdiction of that state in an action to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. In what has become the fundamental inquiry of any
court considering the issue, Chief Justice Stone outlined the relevant factors in determining whether a foreign corporation has a sufAlabama's Nonresident-JurisdictionStatutes: The Reach of the LongArm, 24 ALA. L. REv. 777, 780-84 (1972).
12. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
13. See Comment, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,
73 HAv. L. REV. 909, 919-23 (1960).
14. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cmi. L. REv. 569, 577-86
(1958).
15. In Philadelphia and Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917)
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:

A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal

liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business

within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant
the inference that it is present there.
Id. at 265.
16. E.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). It developed that much
litigation and judicial discussion were devoted to a determination of the cor-

porate activities necessary to constitute "doing business." See Comment,
Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909,
922 (1960).
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

ficient nexus with a state such that it is subject to its jurisdiction:
[D] ue process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' I
This "minimum contacts" test marked a considerable extension of
state jurisdictional power because it eliminated the Pennoyer requirement of physical dominion over the defendant. It was no
longer necessary to establish the "presence" of a corporation in the
forum state. Instead, the activities of its agents there were relevant
only to determine if the corporation had established the requisite
minimum contacts with the forum state so that the exercise of
jurisdiction was reasonable.
The Court recognized that the contacts of a foreign corporation
with the forum state could only be analyzed in terms of the activities performed there by its authorized agents. In general, the
Court realized that corporate contacts with the forum state could be
categorized into four basic factual situations. 19 First, if the corporation carried on continuous and systematic activities within the
forum state and these activities gave rise to the cause of action, the
Court concluded that there was little question but that the corpo20
ration could be forced to defend the suit in the forum state.
However, if the corporation engaged only in a single isolated activity within the forum state and the cause of action was unrelated to
2
that activity, then the forum state could not attain jurisdiction. "
The court then considered two situations in which the finding of
jurisdiction is not as easily susceptible to determination as in the
previous circumstances. If the corporation engaged in continuous
activity within the forum state, but the cause of action was unrelated to that activity, then only if the continuous conduct was
"thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it'22 would jurisdiction be found against the foreign corporation. Finally, if the corporation committed a single act within
the forum state which gave rise to the cause of action sued upon,
then in some circumstances, due to the "nature and quality" of this
act, the corporation would be deemed amenable to suit in the forum
state. 23 In these latter situations the court did not specify what
qualities would make a particular act "of such a nature as to justify
suit . . ." against the corporation. However, the court did note that
18. Id. at 316.
19. For a thorough discussion of these four factual patterns, see Comment, InternationalShoe and Long-Arn Jurisdiction-HowAbout Pennsylvania?, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 319, 320-26 (1970).
20. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 318.
23. Id.
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[T] hose activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. .

.

.Whether due process is satis-

fied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws 24
which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure.
Thus, each case must be decided largely on an ad hoc basis, adhering as nearly as possible to the broad guidelines presented in International Shoe.

The Supreme Court expanded the jurisdictional power of state
courts in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. 25 Using the situational analysis of International Shoe, McGee involved a single
transaction of the defendant corporation within the forum state
which gave rise to the cause of action sued upon. The plaintiff's
decedent had an insurance policy with the defendant, and the latter refused to pay the proceeds upon the death of the decedent, alleging that he had committed suicide. The plaintiff brought suit
against the Texas corporation in California, and the corporation
asserted that California did not have jurisdiction because the
insurance policy in question was the only one it had written in the entire state. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black declared that due process would be satisfied even though the defendant had only a single contact with the forum state provided that
"the suit was based on a contract which had a substantial connection with that State. ' 26 The Court found that this substantial
connection existed because the contract was delivered in California,
the decedent mailed the premiums from that state, and he was a
resident of California at the time of his death. The Court also noted
that it would work a severe hardship on the plaintiff and the other
small claimants of out of state insurance companies if they were
forced to travel to a distant state to litigate their claim. 27 Underlying the reasoning of the court was the realization that the activities
of many corporations were becoming national in scope, necessitat28
ing an expansion of the limits of state court jurisdiction.
24. Id. at 319.
25. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
26. Id. at 223.

27. Id. Some courts have declined to follow the expansive holding in

McGee, asserting that it dealt with an activity of the foreign corporation
which the state treats as exceptional through the enactment of special insurance legislation. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958);
Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959).
But see, Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. FoRuM 533, 549 (1963).
28. Commenting on this situation, the Court stated:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly

This trend toward expansion of state jurisdiction was not to
proceed to the elimination of all restrictions on the in personam
jurisdiction of state courts. The Supreme Court in Hanson v. DencklaD made it clear that due process still required some purposeful activity of the foreign corporation within the forum state. The issue
involved in the case was whether a Florida court could obtain jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee whose sole contact with the state
was the mailing of trust income to the settlor. At the time the
trust had been created the settlor was a resident of Pennsylvania,
but she subsequently moved to Florida, which necessitated the
trustee's contact with that state. The Court distinguished this situation from McGee because the defendant had not solicited the contract in Florida, the agreement had not been executed in Florida,
and Florida had not enacted special "long-arm" legislation for
nonresident trustees as California had for insurance companies.30
Based on these considerations the Court held that the trust agree3
ment had no connection with the forum state. '
In its analysis, the Hanson court noted the trend toward the
expansion of state court jurisdiction, but cautioned that the doctrine of "minimum contacts" still imposed certain restrictions.3 2 In
an attempt to further clarify the concept of "minimum contacts"
the court stated:
The application of that rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 3State,
thus invoking the benefits and
3
protections of its laws.
discernable toward expanding the permissible scope of state juris-

diction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part
this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated
by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern communication and transportation have made it much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.

McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957)..
29. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
30. In addition, the Court found that the defendant trust company had
no office in Florida and transacted no business there. No trust assets were
held or administered in Florida, nor had the defendant ever solicited any
business in Florida, either by mail or in person. Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
31. Id. at 252.
32. Concerning the restrictions which still existed, the Court stated:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.
• . . However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has

had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite

to its exercise of power over him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).

33. Id.at 253.
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Thus, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe and its progeny
constructed a new foundation for due process in the area of state
court jurisdiction over foreign corporationsA4 Following the lead
of these cases, many states have modified their long-arm statutes to
allow their courts to obtain jurisdiction over a broader range of corporate activity. The most expansive of these statutes are those
which contain "single act" provisions. These statutes frequently
permit the forum state to exert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a single tort or contract is the corporation's only contact with the forum state. 35 The term "single act" is a misnomer
to the extent that all the corporation's activities in connection with
that isolated tort or contract are considered in deciding jurisdictional issues.3 6 A more accurate term would probably be "single
transaction."
II.

PRIOR PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES

The first Pennsylvania statute to unequivocally confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation adopted as its basic criterion a "doing business" test. This was subsequently interpreted within the
traditional contraints on state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations which had been established by the United States Supreme
34. Inevitably, the task of determining whether the fundamental fairness of due process has been accorded a nonresident has evolved into a subjective analysis by the court of all the facts of a particular case, weighing
the various interests involved. Commenting on the factors which should
be considered and the approach which should utlimately be taken, Professor Currie stated:
No magic formula leaps to mind to solve all these cases. In each
case all the factors must be considered-among them whether defendant is buyer or seller; whether he or the plaintiff is in business;
who took the initiative, whether the defendant sent agents into the
plaintiff's State, and if so under what circumstances. The relative
abilities of the plaintiff and the defendant to litigate in the foreign
forum may also be relevant. . . . Finally, care should be taken at
the outer limits of fairness not to uphold jurisdiction where the
court feels to do so might discourage people from engaging in interstate transactions. . . . The essence of due process is that proceedings shall be fair; whether they are fair must be subjective judgment based on the common sense of the judge. Such judgments
must be made in other areas of constitutional law, such as determining whether a search or seizure was "unreasonable."
Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. FORuM 533, 577 (1963).
35. E.g., the following states allow the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident who "commits a tortious act within the state": Idaho, IDAHO
CODE § 5-514 (Supp. 1973); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(B) (1964);
Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (Supp. 1973); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (1953); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962).
36. E.g., Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374
(6th Cir. 1968).

Court in Pennoyer v. Neff 3 7 and its progeny. Thus, at the time of
the decision in InternationalShoe, the Pennsylvania courts were unable to avail themselves of the broader jurisdiction permitted by
the new standards concerning federal due process because of its own
statutory limitations. By amendments to the basic statutory definition of "doing business" in 1951, 1963 and 1968 the state legislature
attempted to enlarge the state courts' jurisdiction."8
The Act of 18513 9 permitted suit to be brought against a foreign corporation in any county in the state wherein the corporation had transacted business. The court in Shambe v. Hudson R.R.
Co. 40 elaborated upon the elements necessary to constitute "doing
business," demonstrating the influence of Pennoyer:
We must ascertain if the following requisite essentials appear in this case: (1) The company must be present in the
State, (2) by an agent. . ., (3) duly authorized to represent
it in the State . . ., (4) the business transacted there must
be by or through such agent . . ., (5) the business engaged
in must be sufficient in quantity and quality. . ., (6) there

must4 1 be a statute making such corporations amenable to
suit.

In addition to the Act of 1851, the legislature enacted a series of
registration statutes designed to facilitate the process of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 42 Under these
statutes, as a precondition to transacting any business in the state,
corporations were required to register with the state and also to appoint agents for the purpose of accepting service of process. The
last such provision, the Act of 1911, 43 imposed upon non-complying
corporations the penalties of fine, imprisonment, and a denial of the
use of Pennsylvania courts. However, these registration statutes did
not become the exclusive means of conferring jurisdiction; if a corporation failed to register it was still subject to the state's juris44
diction if it had engaged in business pursuant to the Act of 1851.

In 1933 the legislature enacted the Business Corporation Law 4 5
'and included among its provisions Section 1011 pertaining to jurisdiction over those "qualified" foreign corporations which had registered with the Commonwealth. By subsequent amendments to
37. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
38. For a detailed account of the Pennsylvania experience under its
past statutes dealing with jurisdiction over foreign corporations see Comment, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporationsin Pennsylvania: A Time for
Change, 31 U. Pin. L. REv. 81, 82-94 (1969).
39. Act of April 8, 1851, P.L. 353, § 6.
40. 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755 (1927).
41. Id. at 246-47, 135 A. at 757.
42. Act of April 22, 1874, P.L. 108; Act of June 1, 1889, P.L. 420, § 19;
Act of June 8,1911, P.L. 710.
43. Act of June 8, 1911, P.L. 710.
44. Eline v. Western Md. Ry., 253 Pa. 207, 97 A. 1076 (1916), See note
38 supra.
45. Act of May 5,1933, P.L. 364, §§ 1-1202.
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Section 101146 the legislature attempted to expand the state's jurisdiction, presumably in response to the liberalization of federal due
process requirements found in InternationalShoe.
The 1951 amendment added two new subsections. Subsection
B 47 provided that any foreign corporation which had failed to register with the Department of State was nevertheless amenable to
jurisdiction if it had transacted any business within the state. The
corporation was presumed to have designated the Secretary of the
Commonwealth as its authorized agent to accept service of process.
Subsection C 4 3 defined what constituted "doing business" for purposes of the statute. There were three significant elements in this
definition: (1) the corporation had to make an entry into the Commonwealth; and either (2) engage in a series of similar acts for pecuniary gain; or (3) engage in a single act for pecuniary gain with the
intention of initiating a series of such acts in the future. While these
new subsections allowed the state to exercise jurisdiction over a
broader range of corporate activity than the Act of 1851, they were
nevertheless subject to strict construction by the courts so that
Pennsylvania's jurisdictional reach did not extend to the limits of
due process. 49 The language of 1011(B) providing that the cause
46. Act of Sept. 26, 1951, P.L. 1475, § 22 [hereinafter cited as the "1951
amendment"], amended, Act of August 13, 1963, P.L. 703, §§ 1, 2 [hereinaf-

ter cited as the "1963 amendment"], amended, Act of July 20, 1968, P.L.
459, § 54 [hereinafter cited as the "1968 amendment"] (repealed 1973).
47. In its 1951 form Subsection 1011 (B) provided:
B. Any foreign business corporation which shall have done any
business in this Commonwealth, without procuring a certificate of
authority to do so from the Department of State, shall be conclu-

sively presumed to have designated the Secretary of the Commonwealth as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept, on its
behalf, service of process in any action arising out of acts or omissions of such corporation within this Commonwealth. On petition,
alleging conduct of business within the Commonwealth by any corporation not qualified by the Secretary of the Commonwealth or
having otherwise designated him as agent for the service of process,
the court of the county in which the action is instituted shall authorize service to be made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth....
Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. 364, as amended, Act of Sept. 26, 1951, P.L. 1475,
§ 22 (emphasis added).
48. In its 1951 form Subsection C provided:
C. For the purposes of this act, the entry of any corporation
into this Commonwealth for the doing of a series of similar acts
for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise
accomplishing an object, or doing a single act in this Commonwealth for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a
series of such acts, shall constitute "doing business."
Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. 364, as amended, Act of Sept. 26, 1951, P.L. 1475,
§ 22 (emphasis added).
49. E.g., Gorso v. Bell Equipment Co., 476 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir.
1973).

of action had to arise "out of acts or omissions of such corporation within this Commonwealth" was interpreted to mean that the
act of the corporation which gave rise to the suit had to be committed in Pennsylvania. Therefore, in Rufo v. Bastian Blessing Co.,5°
even though the defendant corporation had engaged in business in
Pennsylvania under 1011 (C), the court could not assert jurisdiction
because the tortious act had occurred outside the state.51 The
1963 amendment eliminated the requirement that the tortious act
52
of the foreign corporation had to be committed within the state.
Therefore, a foreign corporation was amenable to service of process
in any suit arising within the state, provided that it had conducted
business there within the meaning of 1011(C).
The courts also applied a restrictive interpretation to 1011(C).
For jurisdictional purposes, a corporation was "doing business" in
Pennsylvania only if it had made an "entry" into the state through
the presence of an agent or property therein.5 Thus, when a foreign corporation conducted business within the state through an
independent contractor it was not deemed to have made the requisite "entry" into the state and the "doing business" requirements
of 1011(C) had not been met.' 4 Only the physical presence of the
50. 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
51. Id. at 23, 173 A.2d at 129. The court commented on the reach of
the Pennsylvania statute vis-a-vis the limits of due process:
It is clear that the Pennsylvania legislature did not choose to exercise the full extent of jurisdiction conferred upon it and did not
make foreign corporations suable as extensively as it could constitutionally have done. Through the medium of § 1011B, the legislature has validated service upon a non-registered foreign corporation
by service upon the Secretary of the Comonwealth only in a restricted area, i.e. where the action arose out of acts or omissions
of the corporation within the Commonwealth and where a corporation has "done business" in Pennsylvania within the meaning of §
1011 (C).
Id. at 21, 22, 173 A.2d at 128.
52. Act of Sept. 26, 1951, P.L. 1475, § 22. This was accomplished by
the deletion from 1011 (B) of the language responsible for this interpretation
-"out of acts or omissions of such corporation .. " The statute now provided that any corporation doing business within the Commonwealth could
be served with process "in any action arising within this Commonwealth."
53. E.g., Swavely v. Vandegrift, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 153 (C.P. Bucks
1958), aff'd, 397 Pa. 281, 154 A.2d 779 (1959). The court described the entry
requirement as follows:
Obviously, an impersonal corporate entity organized and located in
another jurisdiction can be said, in the words of the statute, to have
"entered" the State of Pennsylvania only if its agents or property
have been physically present therein on the relevant occasion.
Id. at 165-66.
54. E.g., Miller v. Kiamesha-Concord, Inc., 420 Pa. 604, 218 A.2d 309
(1966); Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Co., 208 Pa. Super. 138, 220 A.2d
350 (1966). The Cecere opinion is enlightening because the court found that
the foreign corporation's actvities in Pennsylvania, even though accomplished through an independent contractor, were sufficient to satisfy the
"minimum contacts" test of due process. However, the court found that it
could not assert jurisdiction over the corporation because it was bound to
follow the more restrictive requirements of 1011 (C) which dictated an entry
of the corporation's agent into the state.
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corporation's agents or property in the forum state would constitute a sufficient entry. In addition, 1011(C) provided the further
restriction that a single act of a corporation, before it could serve
as a basis of jurisdiction, had to be done with the intention of initiating a series of such acts. Under this provision courts required
a showing that the foreign corporation contemplated a systematic
and continuous course of conduct before it was found to 'be doing
business within the state. 55' Therefore, the Pennsylvania long-arm
statute did not confer jurisdiction by virtue of a single act, notwithstanding the reasoning in International Shoe that under certain circumstances jurisdiction may be predicated upon a single
act.5 6.
The 1968 amendment made two significant alterations to 1011
(C). First, the "entry" language was deleted from the subsection.
This change meant that if the corporation had maintained sufficient business contacts with Pennsylvania through a subsidiary
or independent contractor, it was now amenable to suit regardless
of the absence of its physical presence within the state. The
court in Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp.5 accurately characterized
this effect of the 1968 amendment:
In so doing, the legislature eliminated the requirement of
an actual corporate presence as a condition precedent to
the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
Rather, it made jurisdiction depend upon whether the corporation derived revenues from activity within the state;
the distribution and marketing system which it set up for
deriving those revenues
was rendered immaterial for juris58
dictional purposes.
Second, the shipping of merchandise into the state was included
within the ambit of "doing business." This was accomplished by
adding to 1011 (C) the following provision:
For the purposes of this subsection the shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this Commonwealth shall be considered
the doing of such an act
in this Commonwealth. 59
55. Greco v. Bucciconi Eng. Co., 246 F. Supp. 261, 262 (W.D. Pa.
1965); Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 185, 240 A.2d 505, 519
(1968).
56. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
57. 476 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 1219. See Acquarium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial
Pressing & Packaging, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 441, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
59. After the 1968 amendment, 1011(C) provided:
C. For the purposes of determining jurisdictions of courts
within this Commonwealth, the doing by any corporation in this
Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object,

Upon the adoption of this language the statute became ambiguous.
There was some question whether Pennsylvania had finally adopted
a "single act" statute as a basis of exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations. That is, whether a single shipment of goods
by the corporation was sufficient to constitute "doing business" under 1011(C). The judicial interpretations of the 1968 amendment
reflected the difficulty in ascertaining the legislative intent behind
the adoption of the shipping provision.
The decision in Benn v. Linden Crane Co.60 best illustrates the
judicial difficulties encountered in the interpretation of the final
version of 1011(C). Initially, the district court exercised jurisdiction over a Swedish corporation, Linden-Alimak, which had "indirectly" shipped a crane into Pennsylvania. Linden-Alimak did not
itself sell the crane in Pennsylvania. Instead, its national distributor bought the crane and then sold it to a purchaser in the United
States who subsequently brought it into the state. The cause of
action arose when the crane allegedly malfunctioned and injured the
plaintiff. After examining the 1968 amendment to 1011 (C), the court
concluded that the legislature intended to expand the state's jurisdiction to the limits imposed by federal due processs. Having
adopted this viewpoint, the court held that a single "indirect" shipment of goods was enough to constitute "doing business" in Pennsylvania.6 1 Two important aspects of the court's reasoning should
be noted. First, the court did not consider the entire scope of Linden-Alimak's contacts with Pennsylvania as manifested by the
number of cranes which its national distributor had sold in the
state. Instead, for jurisdictional issues under the new version of
1011(C) the court considered only the shipment of the single crane
in question. Second, the court adopted a broad interpretation of
the term "indirect shipment." Any manufacturer who placed his
goods into the stream of commerce by sale to a national distributor
was held to have made an "indirect shipment" of goods into Pennsylvania if the goods ultimately arrived in the state. 62 It was unor doing a single act in this Commonwealth for such purpose, with
the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts, shall constitute "doing business." For the purposes of this subsection the
shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this
Commonwealth shall be considered the doing of such an act in this
Commonwealth.
Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. 364, as amended, Act of July 20, 1968, P.L. 459,
§ 54.
60. 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated, 370 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.
Pa.), supp. opinion and order, 370 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
61. Benn v. Linden Crane, 326 F. Supp. 995, 997 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
62. Here the court stated:

Linden-Alimak had reason to know that the crane would be resold

for ultimate use and operation in the United States. The crane,
while being operated in Pennsylvania, allegedly injured plaintiff
by reason of a malfunction claimed to be caused by the manufacturer and others. Under these facts, I find that Linden-Alimak
made an "indirect shipment of goods" into Pennsylvania and was
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important who was finally responsible for bringing the goods into
the state. Therefore, any foreign corporation which utilized a national distributor was subject to suit in Pennsylvania if its goods
were subsequently brought into the state and injured one of the citizens. 68 However, the court did not discuss the single shipment in
light of the other requirements imposed by 1011(C). That is,
whether Linden-Alimak had made a series of similar indirect shipments into Pennsylvania, or had made this single shipment with the
intention of initiating a series of such shipments in the future.
The Benn decision was adopted by other federal courts interpreting

the

definition

of "doing

business"

in 1011(C) 6 4

and

prompted the suggestion that Pennsylvania had adopted the commission of a single tortious act, in the form of a single shipment,
as the basis of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 5 However,
this interpretation of 1011 (C) was rejected by the circuit court in
66
Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corporation.
This case involved a factual situation strikingly similar to that in Benn, yet the court
reached an opposite conclusion. The defendant French corporation
manufactured a crane which had ultimately been delivered in
Pennsylvania. 67
The crane collapsed and injured the plaintiffs.
Aside from the presence of the crane, the defendant's contacts
with Pennsylvania were minimal.68 The district court,"9 following
Benn, held the foreign corporation amenable to suit in Pennsylvania. 70 On appeal, the circuit court reversed this decision, adopting
a more restrictive interpretation of 1011 (C) than appeared in Benn.
Upon analyzing the Pennsylvania experience under its long-arm
statute, particularly 1011 (B) and (C), the court found that the 1968
"doing business" within the definition of the Pennsylvania statute.
Id. at 997.
63. Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp. 476 F.2d 1216, 1220 (3d Cir. 1973).
64. E.g., Smiley v. Gemini Investment Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
65. See 76 DICK. L. REv. 385, 393 (1972).
66. 476 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1973).
67. The foreign corporation's national sales agent sold the crane to a
Kansas construction company which first used it at a job site in Ohio.
Thereafter, it was moved to a new job site in Pennsylvania, where its collapse gave rise to the suit in question. It should be noted that the defendant sold no cranes in Pennsylvania.
68. At the time of the sale of the crane in the United States the defendant's national agent maintained an office in Pennsylvania. However, before
the collapse of the crane the defendant had terminated its relationship with
the national agent so that it had ceased doing business in Pennsylvania
through the agent. The only subsequent contacts with Pennsylvania involved two shipments of spare parts to the job site.
69. Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp., 330 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
70. Id. at 836.

amendment had not altered the basic context of the "doing business" requirement. Rather, like its predecessor in 1963, the statute
still contemplated a "systematic course of conduct rather than isolated or sporadic occurrences" 71 before a corporation could be
viewed as "doing business" for the purpose of the long-arm statute.
Having found that a single act was not a sufficient nexus upon
which Pennsylvania courts could obtain jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, the court concluded that "the current Pennsylvania
statute was not intended to extend the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts to the maximum consistent with constitutional due
process. ' 72 In light of this reasoning, the activities of the defendant
within Pennsylvania-the alleged tortious activity and two sporadic shipments of spare parts-were found insufficient to subject
78
the defendant to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts.
Therefore, the Gorso decision represented a contradiction of the
"single shipment" theory. Further rejection of the Benn position
occurred in Aquarium Pharmeceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial Pressing
& Packaging, Inc. 7 4 In reviewing 1011(C), the court held that the
shipping provision was also subject to the 1011(C) requirement that
it be done with the intention of initiating a series of such acts in
the future before it could qualify as a sufficient basis of jurisdiction. 75 Thus, under the Gorso and Aquarium Pharmeceuticals decisions, a single shipment by a foreign corporation was insufficient
to render it subject to Pennsylvania's jurisdiction, in the absence
of a systematic course of shipments or the intention to initiate a
series of such shipments in the future.
In light of these restrictive interpretations of 1011(C), the district court in Benn 76 vacated its prior order and granted the defendant Linden-Alimak's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
71. Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp., 476 F.2d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 1973).
In reaching this decision the Gorso court cited Greco v. Bucciconi Eng. Co.,
246 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa.
177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967).
72. Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp., 476 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 1223.
74. 358 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
75. In this regard the court stated:
Under the terms of § 2011(C) the "doing of a single act" "for the
purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit" had to be read in
conjunction with the following clause, which required a finding
that such act was done "with the intention of thereby initiating a

series of such acts," before jurisdiction could be taken by courts
of the Commonwealth. In § 2011 (C), the final sentence, which

stated that "the shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into
or through this Commonwealth shall be considered the doing of
such an act," was used only in a definitional sense in that it referred back to the term "single act" in the previous clause. Therefore, shipment of merchandise into the Commonwealth, by itself,
was not sufficient to permit the courts to take jurisdiction unless

the shipment was made with the intention of initiating a series of
such acts.

Aquarium Pharmeceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial Pressing and Packaging, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 441, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
76. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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of in personam jurisdiction." The jurisdictional aberration initiated by the Benn decision had finally been eliminated; under
1011(C) a single shipment of goods per se was not a sufficient corrate activity for purposes of in personam jurisdiction.
Unlike the federal courts, the Pennsylvania courts did not
have much opportunity to interpret 1011 (C) after the 1968 amendment. In McCrory Corporationv. Girard Rubber Corporation78 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court reached a decision consistent with the
Gorso opinion. In that case, a young boy recovered a verdict
against McCrory when he was injured by a defective toy arrow purchased at McCrory's store. Subsequently, McCrory, a Pennsylvania
corporation, sought indemnification from Girard, a foreign corporation, which had manufactured the defective rubber suction tip
for the arrow. Girard had not shipped any of the arrow tips directly into Pennsylvania; rather they were sent to a Tennessee
company which produced the finished arrows and then distributed
them around the country. Based on these facts, the court concluded that Girard could have reasonably foreseen that the arrows
would be marketed in Pennsylvania. The court held that the indirect shipment of the arrow tips into Pennsylvania satisfied the
statutory requirements of "doing business" and held Girard amenable to suit.7 9 However, it would be erroneous to conclude that the
superior court had interpreted 1011(C) as a single act provision,
since Girard had made more than a single indirect shipment of
its product into Pennsylvania. It had engaged in a continuous and
systematic relationship with the middleman, who in turn was marketing the arrows in Pennsylvania. Therefore, the jurisdiction of
the trial court was not predicated upon a single shipment, but
rather upon the series of indirect shipments which the foreign corporation had been making into Pennsylvania, which clearly was
within the purview of the 1968 version of 1011 (C).
In retrospect, it appears that Pennsylvania's experience under
its former long-arm statute can be characterized as a severe limitation upon its power to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corpora77. In so holding, District Judge Van Artsdalen stated:
I interpret Gorso as conclusive of the present issue before the court.
My earlier opinion ascribed a broader purpose and scope to the Act
than that determined by the Third Circuit. For the reasons set

forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, defendant, LindenAlimak's renewed motion to dismiss must be granted.
Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See
notes 126-131 and accompanying text infra for an account of the court's supplemental opinion and order, in which the case was ultimately decided under
the new long-arm statute.
78. 225 Pa. Super. 45, 307 A.2d 435 (1973).
79. Id. at 52, 307 A.2d at 438.

tions. While the various amendments to the statute each served
to liberalize the requirements which Pennsylvania placed upon its
courts for jurisdictional purposes, none of these changes approached
the outer limits of due process as enunciated in InternationalShoe. 0
Even though some courts attempted a liberal interpretation of the
statute, the retention of a narrowly drafted definition of "doing
business" placed a restriction upon them not encountered by
courts in other states which recognized isolated corporate contacts
as a basis for jurisdiction. Numerous states had recognized that a
single shipment of goods, if accompanied by the necessary minimum contacts, was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the corporation responsible for their manufacture."1 However, it is now
conclusive from the case law that the 1963 version of 1011(C) had
not adopted this position. In addition, due process allows other
corporate activities, not enumerated in 1011(C), to form the basis of
jurisdiction. For example, other courts have recognized that a single contract, not involving the shipment of goods by the foreign2
corporation, can subject it to the jurisdiction of the forum state.
In addition, it has been held that a foreign corporation which committed a tortious act in the forum state while providing a service
there had established sufficient contacts for jurisdictional purposes.8 3 However, under 1011(C) these contacts would not have
been sufficient unless accompanied by an intent to engage systematically in such conduct in the future. The present statute may
thus be viewed as an attempt to expand jurisdiction to the fullest
extent allowable.
III.

THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE

The recently adopted Pennsylvania long-arm statute is found
80.
81.

Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp., 476 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,

22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Anderson v. National Presto Ind. Inc.,
257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg.
Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963). These are products liability
cases decided under statutes which typically provide that jurisdiction may
be exercised over a foreign corporation if it committed a "tortious act"
within the state. The courts were not concerned with the quantity of the
corporation's activities within the forum state, but whether the defendant
had shipped the defective product into the forum state.

82. Included in this category are two factual situations:

(1) The resident of the forum state has contracted to supply the foreign corporation with goods, and the cause of action arises out of this

single contract. E.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); Flambeau Plastics v. King Bee Man. Corp.,
24 Wis. 2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1967).

(2) The foreign corporation has breached an executory contract with
the resident of the forum state and no goods are actually shipped. E.g.
Kropp Forge v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962); National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1959).
83. E.g., Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876

(1960); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
(1951).
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in Chapter 83 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act.84 It is a
consolidated statute which compiles and revises the former bases of
jurisdiction and which sets forth separate provisions for exercising
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals and corporations. 5 Those
sections pertaining to individuals 86 provide that any nonresident individual who commits a tortious act8" or does business within the
state, 88 or causes harm within the state by way of an action outside
the state,8 9 will be subject to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania.
These bases of jurisdiction are similar to those proposed in the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act and those states
which have modeled their long-arm statutes after this act.90
An examination of the corporate sections of the statute reveals that many of the features of its predecessor in Section 1011
of the Business Corporation Law have been retained. Section
830191 is the counterpart of 1011 (A), providing that service of process against a registered "qualified" foreign corporation must be
made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth or the Department
of State. In Section 8302(a) 9 2 is found the basis of jurisdiction over
84.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8301-11 (Supp. 1974-75).

85. The statute contains no provision defining the terms "individual"
or "corporation." However, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1991 (Supp. 1974-75),
defines individual as "a natural person," i.e. not a corporation. From this
it may be presumed that those sections pertaining to individuals should not
be applied to corporations and vice versa. In addition, each section pertaining to individuals recites that it applies to
[A]ny nonresident of this Commonwealth who, acting individually
or through a fictitious business name, or through an agent, servant
or employee ....
This indicates that those sections relating to individuals also apply to business associations other than corporations.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8303-06 (Supp. 1974-75).
The sections
applicable to individuals are the same as those provided in the Act of July
1, 1970, P.L. 444, §§ 1-6 (repealed 1973). For a discussion of the bases of
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals as they appeared in the Act of July
1, 1970, see Comment, The Pennsylvania Long-Arm: An Analytical Justification, 17 VILL. L. Rxv. 73 (1971).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8303 (Supp. 1974-75).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8304 (Supp. 1974-75).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8305 (Supp. 1974-75).
90. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1131.1 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60308(B) (1964); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Baldwin 1971); VA. Cone
ANN. § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1973).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 (Supp. 1974-75).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8302 (a) (Supp. 1974-75).
This section
reads:
General Rule.-Any foreign corporation which shall have done any
business in this Commonwealth without procuring a certificate of
authority to do so from the Department of State as required by
statute, shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the Department of State as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept, on its behalf, service of process in any action arising within
this Commonwealth. Service of process shall be made in the manner provided by section 8307 of this title (relating to procedure for
service of process).

nonqualified foreign corporations. It retains the concept formerly
present in 1011 (B), that it is necessary to show that the corporation
transacted business within the Commonwealth. Section 8309(a)"3
contains the definitions of "doing business," which for jurisdictional
purposes can be applied generally to both nonresident individuals
and corporations.
Initially, it should be noted that Section 8309(c) 9

4

excludes

from the definition of "doing business" any corporate activity in the
area of real estate acquisition and financing. This subsection provides:
(c) Exception. Notwithstanding any other provision
of this section, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction
of courts within this Commonwealth, inspecting, appraising
and acquiring real estate and mortgages, and other liens
thereon, and personal property and security interest therein, and holding, leasing away, conveying and transferring
the same, as fiduciary or otherwise, or collecting debts and
enforcing mortgages and rights in property securing the
same by any foreign corporation shall not constitute "doing
business."
The prior long-arm statute contained the same exception in
1011 (D), which had been added in 196695 and later amended in
1968.96 It is likely that this provision was inserted to encourage financing in Pennsylvania. However, it should also be noted that, in
this area, the exception reimposes upon the citizens the potential
burdens of litigating their claims far from Pennsylvania; a burden
which InternationalShoe was intended to relieve.9 7
93. PA.
provides:

STAT. AWN.

tit. 42, § 8309(a) (Supp. 1974-75).

This subsection

(a) General rule.-Any of the following shall constitute "doing

business" for the purposes of this chapter:
(1) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a
series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.
(2) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for
the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise
accomplishing an object with the intention of initiating a series
of such acts.
(3) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into
or through this Commonwealth.
(4) The engaging in any business or profession within this
Commonwealth, whether or not such business requires license
or approval by the Commonwealth or any of its agencies.
(5) The ownership, use or possession of any real property
situated within this Commonwealth.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(c) (Supp. 1974-75).
95. Act of January 18, 1966, P.L. 1305.
96. Act of July 20, 1968, P.L. 459, § 54.
97.

See Comment, International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-

How About Pennsylvania?, 8 DUQ. L. REV. 319, 337 & n.78 (1970), wherein
are voiced questions concerning the scope of the exception and its effectiveness in attracting real estate funds. First, it is questionable whether immunity from suit is an important consideration in the decision to invest in
a particular real estate market. Second, the provision goes beyond excluding only real estate lenders from the statute's coverage. For example, also
excluded are those corporations which purchase real estate or obtain a security interest.
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Subsection 8309(a) lists five definitions of 'doing business"
upon which jurisdiction can be asserted over a "nonqualified" foreign corporation. Each definition is presented as an independent
clause. This is in contrast with the 1968 version of 1011 (C) in which
all the definitions of "doing business" were placed in the same paragraph so that one was read in relation to the others with a resulting narrow interpretation of the provisions.9" The new statute
should avoid such problems.
Under 8309(a) (1) "doing business" includes the performance
of a series of similar acts for the purpose of pecuniary gain. This
concept has long been an element of "doing business," having been
present in 1011(C). 99 Such conduct was also recognized by International Shoe as being a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 10 0 Subsection 8309 (a) (5) stipulates that the ownership, use or possession
of real property situate within the state is "doing business" under
the statute. This provision is similar to Section 331 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil and Equitable Remedies and Procedure' 0 ' which
provides that any owner, tenant, or user of real estate within the
Commonwealth shall be subject to the state's jurisdiction in any
action arising out of an injury or accident involving such real estate.102 However, both 8309(a) (5) and 331 appear to be severely
limited as they apply to corporations due to the previously mentioned exception in 8309(c). This subsection excludes from the definition of "doing business" the acquisition of real estate by a foreign corporation, in partial contravention of those sections basing
jurisdiction on the use, possession, or ownership of real estate.
The remaining definitions of "doing business" in 8309(a) will
be discussed in the context of whether they base jurisdiction on a
single act of the foreign corporation. In 8309(a) (2) the doctrine of
1011 (C) is retained, namely, that a single act, in order to qualify as
"doing business," must be done with the intention of initiating a
series of such acts in the future. Therefore, this subsection does
not mark a departure from the previous position in 1011(C), that a
single act per se is insufficient to constitute "doing business." However, in 8309(a) (3) it seems that the legislature has finally adopted
98. See note 75 supra.
99. See note 55 supra.
100. See notes 20 and 22 supra.
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (Supp. 1974-75).
102. See Comment, International Shoe and Long-Arm JurisdictionHow About Pennsylvania?, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 319, 338-45 (1970). This work
relates the judicial problems encountered in the interpretation and application of Section 331. Among them are the determination of the requisite
causal connection between the real estate and the accident, and who constitutes a user under the statute.

a "single act" as a basis of jurisdiction. Under this subsection, the
direct or indirect shipment of merchandise into the state shall constitute "doing business." Initially, the effect of the provision appears to be no different than when it was present in 1011(C). But
the construction of the new statute, by the placement of each definition of "doing business" as an independent clause, has eliminated
the restrictive interpretation necessarily associated with 1011(C).
As discussed in the previous section, 10 3 under 1011 (C) the shipping clause had to be read with reference to the definition of a "single act" contained in the previous sentence. This definition of a
"single act" required for purposes of "doing business" that it be
done with the intention of initiating a series of such acts. Due to
this particular construction, 1011(C) was interpreted by the federal courts as denying jurisdiction predicated on a single shipment. 104 Under the new statute it would seem that such a restrictive interpretation has been avoided because the shipping clause 05
has been severed from the other definitions of "doing business."
Thus, the future intention requirement associated with a "single
act" in 8309(a)(2) has no effect upon the shipping clause in
8309(a) (3). This clearly indicates that under the new statute jurisdiction may be based on a single shipment of goods into Pennsylvania, whether direct or indirect in nature.
Finally, it may be argued that under subsection 8309 (a) (4) an
isolated business contact of a foreign corporation is included in the
definition of "doing business."' 0 6 This subsection provides that
"doing business" shall include:
The engaging in any business or profession within this
Commonwealth, whether or not such business requires license or approval by the Commonwealth or any of its
agencies. 07
This seems plausible, especially since other states use similar
"transacting any business" provisions to subject corporations to
suit for single acts within the state. 08
However, this particular
interpretation is not appropriate for 8309 (a) (4), because its provision for "engaging" in business also applies to the word "profession,"
103. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
104. Gorso v. Bell Equipment Corp., 476 F.2d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 1973);
Aquarium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial Pressing and Packaging, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 441, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(a) (3) (Supp. 1974-75). See note 88
s-upr.
106. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Long-Arm: An Analytical Justification, 17 VL.L. REv. 73, 93 (1971), wherein this same argument is made
for the application of this subsection to individuals.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309 (a) (4) (Supp. 1974-75).
108. See, e.g., Doyn Aircraft v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971); National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959);
Kropp Forge v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962); Shepler
v. Korkut, 33 Mich. App. 411, 190 N.W.2d 281 (1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, § 17 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (1964).
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making it appear that the legislature intended this subsection to
apply to continuous and systematic conduct, rather than a single
act.
Therefore 8309(a) is only in part a "single act" statute. Application of subsection 8309 (a) (2) is limited to those single act situations where the foreign corporation has the intention of performing similar acts in the future. In addition, 8309(a) (3) allows the
exercise of jurisdiction when the foreign corporation makes at least
a single shipment of goods into Pennsylvania.
A much broader basis of jurisdiction is found in subsection
8309(b) which provides:
Exercise of full constitutional power over foreign corporations.-In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) of
this section the jurisdiction and venue of courts of the Commonwealth shall extend to all foreign corporations and the
powers exercised by them to the fullest extent
allowed un10 9
der the Constitution of the United States.
It appears that this provision extends the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts over foreign corporations to the fullest extent allowed by federal due process requirements. But in any attempt at
interpretation it must be remembered that the general jurisdictional provision for foreign corporations has remained the "doing
business" test of 8302 (a). Therefore, it is submitted that 8309 (b)
should be interpreted as expanding the definition of "doing business" to include, in addition to the corporate contacts enumerated
in 8309(a), any other contacts which have been found to confer
jurisdiction in other states in accordance with due process. 1°9a Most
importantly, this due process provision will confer jurisdiction
upon Pennsylvania courts in the "single act" situations which are
not encompassed in the definition of "doing business" in 8309(a).
This interpretation of 8309(b) is consistent with the legislature's
past trend of liberalizing the definition of "doing business" and the
subsection's stated purpose of extending jurisdiction to the limits of
109.

PA. STAT. AN. tit. 42, § 8309 (b) (Supp. 1974-75).

109a. In a case decided too late for inclusion in the text of this article,
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. 12, 323
A.2d 11 (1974), the Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted the effect of
subsection 8309(b) of the new long-arm statute in the same fashion. In
this regard, the court stated:
Although the statute retains the requirement of "doing business"
as a jurisdictional trigger, the addition of the new section 8309 (b)
. . . is clearly intended to liberalize Pennsylvania's position. Under this section those contacts sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirements of due process are also sufficient to satisfy the "doing
business" requirement of Pennsylvania law.
Id. at 17-18, 323 A.2d at 14.

due process. It requires that 8309 (a) and (b) work in concert, so
that those jurisdictional situations not within the scope of subsection (a) would be decided under the due process provision in subsection (b). For example, if a foreign corporation entered into a
single contract with a citizen of Pennsylvania to purchase goods
produced there, in a cause of action arising out of this single contract, 8309(a) (2) would not apply absent a showing that a systematic and continuous course of conduct was contemplated by the corporation. Also, 8309 (a) (3) would not apply, because there has not
been a shipment of goods into Pennsylvania. However, 8309(b)
would serve to make the foreign corporation amenable to suit in
Pennsylvania if in entering into this single contract it had engaged
in the minimal contacts required by due process. 110 Other states,
which purport to extend the reach of their long-arm statutes as
far as due process allows, have enacted statutes which provide that
"doing business" within the state shall include such diverse activities as the commission of a tortious act within the state or entering into a single contract to be performed in whole or in part
within the state."' While these states expressly provide that a single tort or contract are sufficient bases for jurisdiction, Pennsylvania will most frequently rely upon the due process provision to
achieve these results.llla

Another effect of the due process provision in 8309(b) is a
circumvention of the 8309 (a) (2) requirement that a single act done
for pecuniary gain must be accompanied by the intention of initiating a series of such acts before it can be considered "doing business." When defining the limits of due process, the Court in International Shoe did not impose this requirement before a single act
could qualify as a sufficient jurisdictional contact. 1 2 If the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts is to be extended to the limits of due
process under 8309(b), then the future intention requirement of
8903 (a) (2) should be discarded."' For example, other states have
recognized that a tort committed by a foreign corporation in the
110. Decisions in other states have recognized that jurisdiction can be

based on a single contract. E.g., Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1971); Electronic Mfg. Corp. v. Trion, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.
Ind. 1962).
111. E.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3021b (1964). This statute provies in part:
For the purpose of this Act . . . any foreign corporation ... shall
be deemed doing business in this state by entering into contract by
mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in
whole or in part by either party in this state, or the committing
of any tort in whole or in part in this state.
See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (3) (1969).
lla.
For an account of a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case
which held that a single contract by a foreign corporation to buy goods
from a Pennsylvania producer was a sufficient contact see note 212 infra.
112. See notes 21 and 23 and accompanying text supra.
113. E.g., Mackensworth v. American Trading Transportation Co., 367
F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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performance of a single act for pecuniary gain in the forum state
satisfies the "minimum contacts" test. 114 Under these circumstances, there is no need to show a future intention to satisfy due process,
In effect, the due process provision in 8309(b) allows the state
to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation when any of its contacts
with the state are sufficient to satisfy due process. It therefore
appears that Pennsylvania has obtained the "longest arm," one
which will automatically expand its reach with each liberalization
of the federal due process requirements. 1 5 Although this is indeed
desirable, the statute lacks the specificity desired for consistent interpretation by the courts. The definitions of "doing business" in
8309(a) are themselves sufficiently specific, but they constitute only
a partial list of the recognized corporate activities upon which jurisdiction can be asserted. As a result of this deficiency, when applying the statute courts will frequently have to decide what further activities of the corporation under 8309(b) should be classified
as "doing business" in order to make it amenable to suit consistent
with the farthest reaches of due process. It is submitted that a better approach would have been to model 8309(a) after a statute
similar to the Uniform Act.116 The Uniform Act is a complete statute because it covers the entire range of corporate activities which
See note 153 and accompanying text supra.

114.

115. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (1969), wherein the Rhode Island long-arm statute provides that any foreign corporation which has the
necessary "minimum contacts" with the state shall be subject to its jurisdiction.
116. THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 103
provides:

(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for
relief] arising from the person's

(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this

state;
(4)

causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omis-

sion outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state; [or]

(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state [; or
(6)

contracting to insure any person, property, or risk lo-

cated within this state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon
this Section, only a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
from acts enumerated in this Section may be asserted against him.
See Comment, InternationalShoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-HowAb-out
Pennsylvania?, 8 DuQ. L. REV. 330, 359-60 (1970), wherein is proposed a
long-arm statute for Pennsylvania modeled after the Uniform Act. But see

have been recognized as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. A statute constructed on these comprehensive guidelines would have pro11 7
vided more guidance to the courts in jurisdictional questions.
Thus, the combination of a more comprehensive listing of corporate contacts in 8309(a) with the due process provision in 8309(b)
would have given Pennsylvania the most effective long-arm statute.
A comprehensive 8309 (a) would have provided easier and more consistent application by the courts, while the due process provision allows for expansion of Pennsylvania's jurisdictional powers whenever the federal due process requirements are liberalized.
In addition, the legislature would have been wise to follow the
Uniform Act by providing one long-arm statute which applied its
bases of jurisdiction to both nonresident individuals and corporations.118 Since the language of InternationalShoe indicated that its
analysis was applicable to both individuals and corporations, most
states, like the Uniform Act, make their long-arm provisions applicable to both classes." 9 By following these examples Pennsylvania
could have enacted a less confusing and more manageable statute,
instead of providing different sections and bases of jurisdiction for
individuals and corporations.
IV. THE NEw REACH OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LONG-ARM
In analyzing the new reach of Pennsylvania jurisdiction over
foreign corporations this Comment will focus upon the single act
situation which previously was not within Pennsylvania's jurisdictional powers. l2 0 In particular, analysis of the single tort and con-

note 151 infra, which illustrates one of the situations, products liability,
where the present statute is clear and unambiguous and capable of easy application.

117. See Reese and Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction,44 IowA L. REV. 249, 267 (1959), wherein it
is suggested that a long-arm statute contain a list of illustrative situations
where jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident.
118.

UNIFORM

INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL

PRocEDuRE

ACT,

§

1.01.

This section provides:
[Definition of Person] As used in this Article, "person" includes
an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary
of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this
state.
119. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971); IDAHO CODE § 5.514 (Supp.
1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-235 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1973); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1973).
120. Greco v. Bucciconi Eng. Co., 246 F. Supp. 261, 262 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
Pennsylvania has granted jurisdiction in cases where the corporation engaged in a number of activities within the state, and the cause of action
arose out of these activities. E.g., Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F. Supp.
1002 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Wenzel v. Morris, Distributing Co., 439 Pa. 364, 266
A.2d 662 (1970). Also, jurisdiction has been granted when the corporation
engaged in numerous activities within the state and the cause of action is
unrelated to these activities. E.g., Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa.
177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967).
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tract situations will be presented, since these are the most frequent
forms of corporate activities in the state which create a jurisdictional issue.
It should be emphasized that the forum state cannot assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of an isolated tort
or contract per se. As InternationalShoe cautioned, the single act
must be of a certain nature and quality before it will constitute a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 121 The case law from other states
with liberal long-arm statutes has established some precedent
which describes the specific characteristics of a single act which
will constitute a sufficient contact to satisfy federal due process
requirements.
However, it is important to remember the unique nature of
the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. Unlike statutes modeled after
the Uniform Act, 122 the most expansive provisions of Pennsylvania's statute are the single shipment clause 12 ' and the due process
provision. 124 Both of these sections will apply in the contract and
tort areas. Only by examining the combined effect of these sections will the single tort and contract situations in which a corporation is now amenable to suit in Pennsylvania be ascertained.
A. The Single Tort Situation
1. Products Liability Cases
Undoubtedly, the shipping clause 12 will be used most frequently to sustain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in a products liability action arising out of its shipment of goods into the
state. Initially, it should be noted that the shipping clause is applicable to the situation where a foreign corporation makes a series
of indirect shipments into the state. In the supplemental opinion in
121. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
note 23 and accompanying text supra.

See

122. See note 116 supra. The most notable provisions missing from the

Pennsylvania long-arm statute as it applies to corporations are those which
provide that the "commission of a tortious act" or "contracting to supply
services or things" within the state will make a foreign corporation amenable to suit.

E.g., UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT

§ 1.03 (a) (2) (3).

See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(b) (c)

(Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.715(2) (5) (1968); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.382 (Baldwin 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-235(a) (e) (Supp.
1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2(2) (3) (Supp. 1973).
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309 (a) (3) (Supp. 1974-75). For the text
of this subsection, see note 93 supra.
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(b) (Supp. 1974-75). For the text

of this subsection, see note 109 and accompanying text supra.
125.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309 (a) (3)

(Supp. 1974-75).

Benn v. Linden Crane Co. 1 26 the court faced this issue under the new

long-arm statute.1 27 Through an affidavit filed after the original
opinion, it was learned that the defendant, Linden-Alimak, had sold
nineteen cranes on a continuous basis within the state. The sales
were evenly dispersed over a ten year period. Noting that the new
statute's construction had liberalized the requirements of the shipping clause, 128 the court held that these nineteen sales within the
state were sufficient to subject Linden-Alimak to suit in Pennsylvania. 129 This systematic and continuous course of conduct was
conclusive of the jurisdictional issue in spite of the fact that the
crane which had allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries was not one
of those which had been sold within the state. It was recognized in
InternationalShoe that jurisdiction may be predicated upon continuous and substantial conduct in the forum state, even though the
cause of action was unrelated to the in-state activity."1 0 The district court in Benn held that the systematic sales of Linden-Alimak cranes in Pennsylvania over a ten year period was sufficient
131
conduct to satisfy the demands of federal due process.
When dealing with a products liability case which involves an
isolated shipment by a foreign corporation, the case law of other
states indicates that this single contact is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.' 32 Most courts, when faced with this
126.

370 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

ing text supra, wherein is reported:

See notes 60-77 and accompany-

(1) the district court's initial finding

of jurisdiction over the Swedish defendant, and (2) the court's subsequent
decision to grant the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss the complaint,
and the considerations involved therein.

127. After the court had dismissed the original complaint for lack of

in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff attempted re-service of process upon
Linden-Alimak under Section 8302 of the new long-arm statute. The court
held that the new statute was applicable in this situation, citing Flaherty
v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967). Significant in the court's reasoning was the finding that the long-arm statute is
procedural in nature, so that it is the statute in force at the time of service
of process, rather than the accrual of the cause of action, which controls.

Since re-service was made after the new statute had gone into effect, it was
the relevant statute for resolution of the case.

128. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp., 1269, 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
129. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
130. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See
note 22 and accompanying text supra. Pennsylvania has also adopted this
position. E.g., Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505
(1967). See note 120 supra.
131. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
132. E.g., J. Henrijean & Sons v. M.V. Bulk Enterprise, 311 F. Supp.
417 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (the relevant long-arm provision was, "doing or
causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting
in an action for tort," MIcH. ComP. LAws § 600.715(2) (1968)); Busch v.
Service Plastics Inc., 261 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (the relevant longarm provision was, "causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state . . .", OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2307.382(4) (Baldwin
1971)); Gray v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
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factual situation, have utilized an analysis similar to that found in
Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.1 33 This case advances the theory that a nonresident defendant can be made amen-

able to suit in the forum state based upon a single transaction with
that state. Relying upon the principles propounded by the Supreme
134
Court in McGee and Hanson,
the court formulated three requirements for in personam jurisdiction:
From these two cases, three criteria emerge for determining the present outerlimits of in personam jurisdiction
based on a single act. First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum
state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second,
the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum state to make1 35the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
These three requirements of Southern Machine will be used as an
outline to facilitate the determination of the contacts necessary to
make a foreign corporation subject to Pennsylvania's jurisdiction in
a products liability case involving a single shipment of goods. 3 6
N.E.2d 761 (1961) (the relevant long-arm provision was, "commits a tortious act in this state," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1965)). Decisions similar to those in Gorso v. Bell Equipment Co., 476 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1973)
and Nelson v. Doll Furniture Co., 304 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1969) will no
longer be relevant precedent in Pennsylvania. In those cases the holdings
that jurisdiction could not be based on a single shipment were made under
the former long-arm statute.
133. 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
134. See notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
135. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381
(6th Cir. 1968).
136. Most courts which consider a jurisdictional question involving a
single act do not specifically consider, checklist fashion, each of the requirements involved in the Southern Machine analysis. However, each of the
elements required by Southern Machine are usually present before courts
will exercise jurisdiction. It is submitted that the Southern Machine requirements represent the best summary of the due process requirements for
single act situations, because it is based upon the International Shoe line
of cases, and reflects the reasoning of the Supreme Court contained therein.
See Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Ind. Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 380-81 (6th
Cir. 1968). For this reason, the three requirements of Southern Machine
constitute the best outline available for a consideration of in personam jurisdiction based on a single act. Subsequent to the completion of the text
of this article the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Procter & Schwartz, Inc.
v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974) adopted the
three step test of Southern Machine in a case involving a single contract.
See note 212 infra. A similar three-pronged analysis has been adopted
by other courts around the country. See, e.g., Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v.
Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971); Aftanese v. Economy Baler Co., 343
F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Kourhene v. American B.B.R., Inc., 313 F.2d 769

First, the corporation must have purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence
there. Generally, the courts have found that a corporation which
placed a particular product into the channels of commerce so that
it was foreseeable that it would ultimately be marketed in the
13 7
forum state had met this "purposefully availing" requirement.
138
Thus, in Ehlers v. U.S. Heating and Cooling Manufacturing Corp.,
an Ohio corporation whose only contact with the forum state of
Minnesota was the presence of a boiler which it had manufactured
was held subject to jurisdiction in a cause of action for damages
allegedly caused by the boiler.13 9
Second, the cause of action must arise from the foreign corporation's activities in the forum state. This requirement was noted
by the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe. 140 In cases involving
a single shipment of goods, the plaintiff's injury must have a substantial connection with that shipment.' 41 Given this requirement,
(9th Cir. 1963); L.D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Ind., 265 F.2d
768 (9th Cir. 1959); White v. Goldthwaite, 204 Kan. 83, 460 P.2d 578 (1969);
Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc. of Washington, 62
Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963). In addition, Southern Machine has been
followed in: In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air., Inc., 466 F.2d 220
(6th Cir. 1972); King v. Harley Chevrolet Co., 462 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972);
Hill v. Smith, 337 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Mich. 1971). See also Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on a Single Act: A New Sole
for International Shoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342 (1958). But see Comment, Minimum Contacts Confused and Reconfused-Variations on a Theme by International Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 304, 312
(1970), wherein this three step analysis is criticized.
137. See Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970);
Duple Motor Bodies LTD. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969);
Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Andersen v.
National Presto Ind. Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965); Sheridan
v. Cadet Chemical Corp., 25 Conn. Sup. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (1963). But see
Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966),

wherein the court deplores the overemphasis on the "purposefully availing"
test:
We disagree with those states which have conceded significance to
the "purposeful activity" language of Hanson by refusing jurisdic-

tion in products liability cases over a defendant who could not fore-

see the presence of his product in the forum. Conceding significance to the "purposeful activity" language of Hanson may have
been responsible for the tortious conduct statutes which have been
difficult to apply in certain factual situations.
Id. at 259, 413 P.2d at 737.
138. 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963).
139.

The relevant Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

303.13(3)

(1969), provides for jurisdiction if "such foreign corporation commits a tort
in whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota ..
" The
court found that a tort had been committed in Minnesota since personal injury had occurred there through the use of the boiler, even though the boiler
had been manufactured outside the state.
140. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See
note 23 and accompanying text supra.
141. See Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1247 (D.S. Car. 1969);
Foye v. Consolidated Baling Machine Co., 229 A.2d 196 (Me. 1967). In the
preceding cases the cause of action was related to the shipments of goods in
question. Due to the specific language in International Shoe that, in order

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the shipping clause in the Pennsylvania statute may be unconstitutional if given too literal an interpretation by the courts. For example, the statute provides that a corporation which "does business" within Pennsylvania is subject to its jurisdiction, 14 2 and defines as "doing business" a single shipment of goods into the
state. 14 3 If a defendant corporation does in fact make a shipment of
goods into Pennsylvania, technically it has engaged in business and
would apparently be subject to suit, even though the plaintiff's
cause of action may be unrelated to that shipment. Such a result
would likely violate the due process limitations of International
144
Shoe.
Finally, the acts of the corporation should have a substantial
connection with the forum state so that its exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant is not unreasonable. Courts have found that
corporations have met this requirement in much the same way that
they have been found to meet the "purposefully availing" test-by
placing the product into the channels of commerce so that the possibility exists that it will cause harm in any state. 145 As the court
in Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club146 elaborated:
When a manufacturer voluntarily chooses to sell his product in a way in which it will be resold from dealer to dealer,
transferred from hand to hand and transported from state
to state, he cannot reasonably claim he is surprised at being
held to147answer in any state for the damage the product
causes.
Therefore, corporations which distribute their product on a national
scale are potential defendants in almost any state in which their
product malfunctions and causes injury. 48 The exception to this
to predicate jurisdiction on a single act, the cause of action must have arisen
from that act, few plaintiffs bring suit in the absence of this causal connection. Therefore, this second requirement has rarely been a big issue in
products liability litigation.
142.
143.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8302 (Supp. 1974-75).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(b) (3) (Supp. 1974-75).

144. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
145. Indeed, the courts have gone so far as to say that a manufacturer
is amenable to suit in any state where his product causes injury. E.g., Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961); Andersen v. National Presto Ind., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639
(1965); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 258 Minn. 571, 94 N.W.2d 888
(1960). See Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturersin Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1031-32 (1965).
146. 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
147. Id. at 649.
148. E.g., Tate v. Renault, 278 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), wherein
the court commented on the vulnerability of foreign corporations to suit in

general rule is found in those states which have modeled their
long-arm statutes after the Uniform Act.149 These statutes require
that the foreign corporations have other contacts with the forum
state in addition to the shipment of goods and are therefore more
restrictive than the present Pennsylvania statute.' 50° However,
such statutes would seem to stop short of the outer limits of due
process as prescribed in Southern Machine and its line of cases discussed above, and need not be followed by the Pennsylvania courts
in connection with the single shipment clause.
It should be noted that the shipping clause is a clear and unambiguous provision capable of easy application in the area of products liability. Under its provisions, it is only necessary to show
that the foreign corporation shipped goods into the state and that
the requirements of due process have been met.15 1
any state in which its product causes injury:
[A] manufacturer who voluntarily places his product in the na-

tional channels of commerce not only submits himself to jurisdiction in all states where his product causes injury but also to the
laws of those states.
Id. at 459. Cf., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d
732 (1966), which set out three factors which should be considered in determining whether a foreign manufacturer should be amenable to suit in a
products liability case: (1) the nature and size of the manufacturer's business, (2) the economic independence of the plaintiff, and (3) the nature
of the cause of action including the applicable law and the practical matters
of trial.
149. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRocEDuRE ACT § 1.03
(a) (4). See note 116 supra.
150. These additional contacts usually take the form of (1) regular solicitation of business, or (2) a persistent course of conduct, or (3) the realization of substantial revenue from goods sold in the forum state. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1(c) (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92(d) (1957);

MAss.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 223A, § 3(d) (Supp. 1973); OHIo

REV. CODE

(Baldwin 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2(4) (Supp.
1973). In Jackson v. National Linen Service Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962 (W.D.
Va. 1965), the court required a finding that the defendant manufacturer had
earned "substantial" revenue from his Virginia operations before asserting
jurisdiction. Accord Mark v. Obear & Sons, Inc., 313F. Supp. 373 (D. Mass.
1970); Busch v. Service Plastics, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
151. The Pennsylvania long-arm will avoid many of the semantical difficulties which other states have encountered in the interpretation of their
long-arm statutes. Particularly troublesome have been those statutes which
base jurisdiction on a "tortious act" committed in the state. See note 33
supra. This language proved awkward for some courts in product liability
cases, because they reasoned that the tortious act was committed in the state
of manufacture and not the state of injury. Therefore, courts refused to
hold the out of state manufacturer amenable to suit when its only contact
with the forum state was the shipment of goods. See, e.g., Di Meo v. Minster Machine Co., 225 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1963); Hellriegel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Some courts circumvent this
ANN.

§ 2307.382(4)

problem by following the rule found in

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 377 (1934), which provides, in part: "The place of wrong is in the state
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort
takes place." Thus it has been held that the situs of the injury is the state
wherein the tort has occurred. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
SanitaryCorp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Andersen v. National
Presto Ind. Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating
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2.

The Single Tort Unconnected with the
Shipment of Goods

While a majority of the tort actions instituted against a foreign
corporation are products liability cases, it is possible that a citizen
of Pennsylvania will be injured through corporate activity unconnected with a shipment of goods. Obviously, in such a situation
the shipping clause will be of little aid to the plaintiff in establishing that the corporation has engaged in any business within the
state. However, the due process provision in 8309(b) will provide a
basis of jurisdiction, drawing upon the long established precedent
of other states which have held that the commission of a single
tortious act within the forum state is a sufficient nexus for jurisdic152
tional purposes.
The leading case on this point is Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corporation,5 3 in which a Massachusetts roofing company was held amenable to suit in Vermont for damages arising
out of a negligently performed job upon the plaintiff's house in
Vermont. The relevant Vermont statute 54 equated "doing business" within the state with the commission of a tortious act there.

This is essentially the interpretation which the Pennsylvania courts
will have to make under 8309(b) if jurisdiction over corporations
is to be expanded to the limits of due process.1 55 The Smyth court

found that due process requires only that two conditions be met before jurisdiction can be based upon a single tortious act: (1) the
tortious act must occur within the forum state, and (2) the cause
& Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963). Other states
have avoided this problem through long-arm provisions which base jurisdiction on a "tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state. . .

."

E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1(c)

ANN. § 8-81.2(4) (Supp. 1973).

(1971); VA. CODE

Pennsylvania has such a provision for non-

resident individuals, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8305 (Supp. 1973).

For a dis-

cussion of semantical difficulties involved with the various long-arm statutes, see Comment, In Personam JurisdictionOver Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028, 1035-43 (1965). No
such problems of interpretation should arise under 8309 (a) (3) of the Pennsylvania statute because all that it requires is a shipment of goods into the
state and, by way of due process, that the cause of action arise out of the
use of the goods so shipped.
152. For this particular situation the relevant state statutes provide that
"the commission of a tortious act within the state" shall be the basis of jurisdiction. See note 35 supra. Pennsylvania also has this provision for nonresident individuals. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8303 (Supp. 1974-75).
153. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
154. The modern counterpart of this statute is VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 855 (1973).
155. The Texas and Minnesota statutes also make this provision. See
note 111 and accompanying text supra.

of action must be predicated upon the tortious act.1

0

Courts in other jurisdictions, in applying basically the same
type of statute, have consistently demanded compliance with these
two conditions. In a majority of the cases considered, the defendant corporation had sent its agents into the forum state to perform
some service for the plaintiff, out of which the cause of action
157
the dearose. In Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc.,
fendant corporation sent employees to the plaintiff's place of work
in Minnesota to supervise the assembly of a punch press. The corporation was found subject to suit in Minnesota when, due to the
alleged negligent supervision by its employees, the punch press
malfunctioned and injured the plaintiff.155
The application of 8309(b) should not be limited to negligent
torts of the foreign corporation, but should also be utilized when
15 9
an intentional tort is in issue. In Painter v. Home Finance Co.
a North Carolina citizen mortgaged her car to a finance company
incorporated in South Carolina. The finance company was held
amenable to suit in North Carolina when the complaint asserted
that one of its agents entered the state and unlawfully repossessed
the mortgaged vehicle. The court considered it mere surplusage to
consider the finance company's other contacts with the state in light
of its tortious conduct. 160
B.

Actions Based on a Single Contract

The combined effect of the single shipment and due process
provisions of Pennsylvania's long-arm statute will be most evident
when the foreign corporation's contacts are limited to a single contract with a Pennsylvania resident. In those cases in which a shipment of goods has been made by the corporation as its performance under the contract, the appropriate long-arm provision will be
the shipping clause in 8309 (a) (3). However, when no shipment has
been made under the contract then it will be necessary to exercise
156. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 575, 80 A.2d
664, 668 (1951).
157. 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960).
158. Id. at 879. See Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga.
1971); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), in which an
employee of the defendant injured the plaintiff in the forum state of Illinois
while delivering an electric stove. The court did not consider it unfair to
assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in view of the fact that
he had sent his employee into Illinois to advance his own pecuniary interest.
Also, while in the state, the employee and the defendant enjoyed the benefit
and protection of its laws.
159. 245 N.C. 589, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957).
160. See Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 16 N.Y.2d 706, 209
N.E.2d 554, 261 N.Y.S.2d 898, a!f'd, 382 U.S. 110 (1965) (nonresident defendant allegedly stole trade secrets from a New York company); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969) (foreign corporations
allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to convert the assets of an insurance company, most of whose policy holders were residents of the forum state of
Minnesota).
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jurisdiction under the due process provision found in 8309(b).
The first case to interpret the new long-arm statute involved
a single shipment of goods into the state by a foreign corporation
pursuant to a contract with a Pennsylvania corporation. In Aquarium Pharmeceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial Pressing and Packaging,
Inc."' a Pennsylvania corporation solicited a purchase of tropical
fish tablets over the telephone from a Wisconsin aquarium pharmeceutical company. After the goods were shipped directly into
Pennsylvania by the defendant, the plaintiff alleged that they were
defective and brought suit for damages. Noting that 8309(a) (3)
now permitted jurisdiction predicated on a single shipment without
the necessity of showing a future intention, the federal district
court ruled that the Wisconsin corporation had to defend the suit in
Pennsylvania. 16 2 This decision certainly represents the limits of
due process based upon a single contract, because the contacts
which the defendant had with Pennsylvania were as minimal as any
commercial setting will allow between a buyer in the forum state
and a seller in another state. 163 If the interpretation given the statute in Aquarium Pharmaceuticals is any indication of its future
applicability, then Pennsylvania will become a front-runner among
those states which liberally exercise their jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. Yet, the decision appears to be constitutionally
sound, based on the criteria set forth in Southern Machine 64 to determine when jurisdiction may be predicated on an isolated contact
with the forum state. The defendant purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of acting in the forum state by directly shipping the
goods there, and the cause of action arose from the single contract
between the parties. On the issue of the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant, the court modeled its reasoning after the Supreme Court opinion in Hanson v. Denckia: 165
States have always had a legitimate and substantial interest in safeguarding the rights and property of their citizens.
It is not unreasonable for them to expect foreign businessmen, who involve themselves, to one degree or another, in
commercial transactions with citizens of their state to accept the corresponding burden of accepting service and defending themselves in a court of that state. 6
161. 358 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
162. Id. at 445.
163. The defendant neither maintained an office in nor sent any agents
into Pennsylvania in connection with the contract in question. The defendant merely took the telephone order from the plaintiff and shipped the
goods into Pennsylvania.
164. Southern Machine v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th
Cir. 1968). See notes 133-136 and accompanying text supra.
166. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
166. Aquarium Pharmeceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial Pressing & Packag83

By engaging in commercial activity within the state, the corporation enjoys the benefits and protections of its laws. It is not unreasonable to compel the corporation to accept the reciprocal burden
of defending suit in any action arising from this in-state activity.
As previously mentioned, when no shipment has been made under the contract it will be necessary to exercise jurisdiction under
8309(b). Here, jurisdiction will most likely be invoked when the
foreign corporation has breached an executory contract to deliver
goods or when it has contracted to buy goods from a Pennsylvania
citizen and is being sued in connection with that contract. However, in order to apply this provision the Pennsylvania courts must
ascertain whether the corporation's activities with the state satisfy
the "minimum contacts" test of federal due process as outlined by
the United States Supreme Court in Hanson and McGee.167
It has been generally recognized that jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation can be predicated on a single contract. As the court in
Shepler v. Korkut6 I stated:
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit
be based on a contract which had a substantial connection
may be
with the state of the forum. A single transaction
sufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" test.16 9
In a number of jurisdictions the physical presence of an agent
in the forum state in connection with the contract is a sufficient
contact upon which to base jurisdiction. Thus, it was held in Scovill Manufacturing Co. v. Dateline Electric Company 70 that precontract negotiations conducted by an agent of the foreign corporation in the forum state of Illinois were sufficient to obtain jurisdiction. 1 1 Likewise, in Kropp Forge v. Jawitz,11 2 an entry by the defendant into the forum state to inspect generators before contracting to purchase them was sufficient contact to confer jurisdicing, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
167. See notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
168. 33 Mich. App. 411, 190 N.W.2d 281 (1971).
169. Id. at 415, 190 N.W.2d at 283. However, some courts have set more
rigid standards in the exercise of jurisdiction in the isolated contract situation than in cases dealing with a single tort. E.g., Newman v. Fleming, 331
F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971), wherein the court stated:
It is easier to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident tort feasor than
over a nonresident wrongdoer in fields other than torts. In the latter instance jurisdiction is posited under the statute on the defendant's transacting any business in this State . .. (citation omitted)
and in such cases Due Process must be satisfied by the existence
of "minimum contacts" of the nonresident in the state in which he
Jurisdiction over nonresidents in tort actions carries
is sued ....
no such impediments. The minimum contacts requirement does
not have to be read into the language "Commits a tortious act or
omission in this state." Where a nonresident enters a state and
commits a tort no showing of continuous activity in the jurisdiction
is required. Jurisdiction is sustained by the commission of a single
tort.
Id. at 974.
170. 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972).
171. Id. at 900.
172. 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962).
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tion on the forum state of Illinois. The defendant's contacts were
very minimal, since the negotiations had been conducted by mail
and the inspection visit by the defendant was his only activity
within the forum state. 17. In Michael Schiavone and Sons v. GalLand-Henning Manufacturing Co. 17 4 the court held that an agree
ment by the plaintiff to buy a scrap press from the foreign corporation was a sufficient nexus for jurisdiction where the defendant
had entered Connecticut to negotiate the sale, to supervise the installation of the press, and to test the machinery after it had failed
to operate properly and had made the machine for use in that
175
state. While the physical presence of the foreign corporation in the
forum state may be enough to establish minimum contacts, it is not
a prerequisite to an assertion of jurisdiction by the forum state.
Where there is no physical presence, the single act analysis of Southern Machine1 7 6 is relevant to the isolated contract situation. The
federal district court in that case predicated jurisdiction on a single
contract between the parties and its reasoning has been used by
other courts faced with similar factual situations. 177 Under the
analysis of Southern Machine, the corporation must satisfy three
requirements before it is subject to suit in the forum state.
.
First, it is necessary that the corporation has acted in the forum
state or caused a consequence there. This is modeled after the reasoning in Hanson,17 that the defendant must engage in some pur173. Accord, Kokomo Opalescent Glass Co v. Arthur W. Schmid-Inter.
Inc., 371 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1966) (installation and repair of a machine in
the forum state); National Gas Appliance Corp. v. A.B. Electrolux, 270 F.2d
472 (7th. Cir. 1959) (solicitation of the sale and pre-contract negotiations
took place in the forum state); Temco Inc. v. General Screw Products, Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (negotiations took place in the forum

state).

.

174. 263 F. Supp. 261 (D. Conn. 1967).
175. Id. at 263.
176. Southern Machine Co., Inc. v. Mohasco. Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d
374 (6th Cir. 1968). See notes 133-136 and accompanying text supra. The
Southern Machine case itself is concerned with jurisdiction based on a single
contract, a licensing agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant New
York corporation. The court found that the defendant's contacts with the
forum state of Tennessee, in connection with this single licensing agreement,
-were sufficient to obtain jurisdiction without considering, the defendant's
other business contacts with the state.
177. E.g., In-Flight Devices, Inc. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220
(6th Cir. 1972); Doyn Aircraft v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971); L.D.
Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Ind., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959);
Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc. of Washington, 62
Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963). All these cases used an analysis similar
.to that in Southern Machine in dealing with a single contractual agreement
as the basis of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. See note 136 supra.
178. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.

poseful activity with the forum state. But purposeful corporate
activity, most notably the creation of obligations which have an impact on the commerce of the forum state, is not always manifested by the presence of an agent. If the corporation enters into
such obligations, and it is reasonably forseeable that the transaction will have commercial consequences in the state, then the corporation has purposefully "acted" in the forum state.179 The commercial consequences are the same for the forum state whether an
agent was physically present for negotiations or not.18 0 This line
of reasoning has been utilized in several cases. For example, in
Electro-CraftCorporationv. Maxwell Electronics,'8' a Texas corporation was found amenable to suit in Minnesota in conjunction
with an agreement to sell 320 receiver transmitters to a resident
corporation. Even though no agent of the defendant corporation
had entered Minnesota during the term of the contract, the court
found that contractual consequences were foreseeable in that state,
mostly in the form of an impact on the state's commerce. 8 2 This
was enough to find that the corporation had engaged in purposeful
activity with the forum state for jurisdictional purposes.1 83 In
Kornfueher v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc.8 4 the Bindery entered
into a contract by mail to sell goods to a Minnesota resident. However, before the contract was performed, the Bindery attempted to
rescind the contract because it had made an error in cost estimates.
Drawing an analogy to McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.' s" the district court sitting in Minnesota found that it was reasonable to obtain jurisdiction even though the defendant had no
other contacts with the forum state, particularly since the defendant had engaged in national commerce in the normal course of its
profit making activities. 86 But not insignificant in the reasoning
of the court was that the consequences of the breach occurred in
179. In-Flight Devices, Inc. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 226
(6th Cir. 1972).
180. E.g., Shepler v. Korkut, 33 Mich. App. 411, 190 N.W.2d 281 (1971).
In this case the defendant corporation designed a boat which was to be used
as a water taxi in the state of Michigan. In a subsequent action brought
by the owner in Michigan, the court held that the single contract could serve
as a basis for jurisdiction, particularly since the boat was designed for the
purpose of ferrying passengers in Michigan.
181. 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969).
182. The value of the transaction had the most significant impact on
the commerce of Minnesota. The transaction involved the sale and shipment of 278 units over a period of twenty-one days and was valued at $132,000. In addition, the defendant made use of interstate commerce to complete the transaction, using mail, telephone and trucking facilities. Id. at
369.
183. Accord, In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d
220, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1972).
184. 240 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1965).
185. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
186. Kornfueher v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 157, 161 (D.
Minn. 1965).
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Minnesota, where the plaintiff buyer had sustained a loss from his
1 7
inability to meet resale agreements. 1
The second requirement of Southern Machine is that the cause
of action must arise out of the single contract. 8 8 As previously
mentioned, in the situational analysis presented by the Supreme
Court in InternationalShoe, 8 9 the cause of action must be related
to the single activity of the foreign corporation in the forum state
if jurisdiction can be obtained. Therefore, courts will not consider
a single contract a sufficient nexus unless the cause of action is
predicated upon that single contract. 190 However, a recent case decided by a federal district court applying Pennsylvania law and interpreting the new statute seemed to ignore this generally recognized requirement. In Mackensworth v. American Trading Transportation Co.19' a seaman was discharged from one of the defendant's ships in Houston before the end of a voyage and brought action for the resultant lost wages.192 The plaintiff asserted that
187. Id. at 162. Accord, Capital Consultants Corp. v. Charles Williams
Real Estate Investment Corp., 352 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). Cf.,
Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1002-1003 (N.D.
I1.1967).
188. In In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th
Cir. 1972) the court dealt with an isolated contract as the basis of jurisdiction. In regard to the second element of Southern Machine, the court
stated:
Defendant's transaction of business in Ohio-its entering of a contractual relationship with an Ohio corporation-is necessarily the
very soil from which the action for breach grew. The intimate relationship between the jurisdictional basis and the cause of action
necessary to the validity of any single act long-arm jurisdictional
assertion cannot be denied here.
Id. at 229.
189. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See
note 23 and accompanying text supra.
190. E.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220,
228 (6th Cir. 1972); Doyn Aircraft Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579, 582 (10th
Cir. 1971); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365,
369 (8th Cir. 1969); Aftanese v. Economy Baler, Inc., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th
Cir. 1965); Kourhene v. American B.B.R., Inc., 313 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir.
1965); L.D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Ind., 265 F.2d 768, 774
(9th Cir. 1959).
191.

367 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

192. It should be noted that even though this case concerned admiralty
law, the court's interpretation of Pennsylvania's new long-arm statute establishes valid legal precedent. It is not uncommon for state statutes pertaining to service of process to be utilized in an admiralty proceeding, particularly when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7),
specifically adopts state law as a valid means of service of process. E.g.,
S.S. Phillipine Jose Abad Santos v. Bannister, 335 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1964).
The Mackensworth opinion is unique because it is written in poetic
form. While this is a refreshing break from the conventional prose style
of legal case reporting, unfortunately most of the important facts, and in

Pennsylvania had jurisdiction because one of the defendant's ships
had docked at a Pennsylvania port in 1972. There was no showing
by the plaintiff that he was discharged while in Pennsylvania waters, or that the agreement to work for the defendant had been
made in Pennsylvania. Instead, both the hiring and dismissal of the
plaintiff occurred in Texas. 9 8
Despite this minimal contact
which the defendant New York shipping company had with Pennsylvania, the court held that it could exercise jurisdiction. In so
holding, the court relied upon Section 8309 (a) (2) 194 of the new longarm statute as the appropriate provision. The court found that the
statute, in its new form, permitted a single act done for pecuniary
gain to form the basis of jurisdiction, without the requirement that
the act be performed with the intention of initiating a series of such
acts.195
Although such a single act would normally be sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of InternationalShoe and Southern Machine, it would seem that the facts in Mackensworth do not
meet those requirements. The plaintiff failed to show some causal
connection between the cause of action and the defendant's single
contact with the state. Absent a showing that the parties contracted in Pennsylvania, or that the plaintiff's discharge occurred
on the defendant's boat while it was docked in Pennsylvania waters,9 6 the decision must be viewed as going beyond the limits of
due process. 19 7
The third requirement of Southern Machine is that the acts of
the foreign corporation, or the consequences caused by it, must bear
some instances, the reasoning of the court are not clearly conveyed. As a
example of this deficiency, it was not clearly reported in the opinion of the
court where the plaintiff's discharge took place. However, an examination
of the pleadings filed in this case reveals that the plaintiff signed on with

one of the defendant's vessels (not the same ship that subsequently docked

in Pennsylvania) at Beaumont, Texas and was discharged in Houston,
Texas. Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, Mackensworth v. American
Trading Transportation Co., 367 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
193. See note 192 supra.
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309 (a) (2) (Supp. 1974-75).
195. Here the court stated:
The particular problem which deserves mention
is whether a single act done for pecuniary gain also requires a fu-

ture intention.
As our holding suggests, we believe the answer is no,
and feel that is how the Pa. appellate cases will go.

Mackensworth v. American Trading Transportation Co., 367 F. Supp. 373,
375 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra. In
addition, the court noted that because of the Aquarium Pharmaceuticaldecision, the future intention requirement.for the shipping clause in 8309 (a)

(3) had also been eliminated. See note 161 and accompanying text supra.

196. C.f., Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir.
1965); Alcalde v. Los Mayas, 184 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Va. 1960). In both

these cases a factor was whether the cause of action had arisen in the territorial waters of the forum state.

197. See Lieth v. Oil Transport Co., 210 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Pa. 1962),
wherein the court held that a transient call at a Pennsylvania port was not
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, especially since the incident giving rise

to the cause of action occurred in Kentucky.
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a substantial connection with the forum state so that the exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable. The ultimate resolution of this question is greatly influenced by a determination of whether the forum
state has an interest in settling the controversy.1 98 Undoubtedly,
the forum state has an interest in any suit brought by one of its
residents,1 99 but this interest alone will not suffice to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Other factors considered important are the defendant's surprise, his financial inability to defend suit in the forum state, and 2the
nature and
0
quantity of his physical contacts with the forum state.
In determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on a single contract is reasonable, some
courts have made the distinction between buyer and seller.-0 1 In
this regard, there would seem to be bias in favor of the nonresident
buyer. Courts will more frequently exert jurisdiction over the
seller who solicits the sale, arranges and conducts the negotiations
and finally ships goods into the state than over the defendant-buyer
who has traditionally occupied a more passive role. 20 2 For example, in McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc.2 0 3 a New York corporation contracted with a Minnesota firm to buy some air conditioning equipment. This single contract was the only connection
which the defendant had with Minnesota. 20 4 Distinguishing this
from the situation in which the defendant was sending goods into
the state, the district court in Minnesota refused to grant jurisdiction:
The general philosophy of long-arm statutes is to protect
citizens of a state where a nonresident comes into the State
directly or indirectly to sell something or solicit sales, or
where, even though out of state, a nonresident sells a product which is brought into or comes to rest in the State....
The nonresident is the aggressor or initiator. It is appropriate that such a nonresident seller should respond to service of process in that state. Quite the contrary, however,
where in a case such as at bar the plaintiff [resident-seller]
198. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 384
(6th Cir. 1968).
199. Id. at 385; Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp., 421 F.2d 467, 470
(8th Cir. 1970).
200. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 23235 (6th Cir. 1968).

201. E.g., Fourth Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v. Hilson

Ind. Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
202. E.g., In-Flight Devices v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 23233 (6th Cir. 1972); Oswalt Ind. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D. Kan.
1969).
203. 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971).
204. The defendant had no office, agent, address, license to do business
or telephone in Minnesota.

is the movant, the aggressor. .... If merely because the
manufacturing process and payment of the price is to occur
in Minnesota such confers jurisdiction in Minnesota, then
any case where the long-arm statit's hard to conceive
20 5 of
utes do not apply.

In part, this bias stems from a reluctance by the states to take an
nonresident buyers by mail order
interest in suits brought 2against
06
houses in the forum state.
However, other courts have adopted the theory which McQuay
expressly rejects: if the nonresident enters into a contract to purchase goods which causes a substantial consequence in the forum
state, then exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. For example, in
Colony Press v. Fleeman20 7 the Illinois Appellate Court exercised
jurisdiction over an Ohio corporation which had contracted over the
telephone with an Illinois seller for an order for printing to be done
in Illinois. The Illinois court exercised jurisdiction, based on these
factors:
[D]efendant should have known that he might be liable
to suit in Illinois if the bill were not paid. .

.

. The defend-

ant was aware or should have been aware that the printing
would be done in Illinois. .

.

. The essential points of this

business transaction for purpose of the jurisdictional questions are that plaintiff accepted the contract in Illinois
and that it was contemplated by the parties that seller's
performance would be conducted wholly within Illinois.208
Some courts strike a middle ground between these two polar
positions and exert jurisdiction when the contract calls for substantial production of goods in the forum state and the foreign corporation engages in activity there. 209 In In-Flight Devices Corp. v.
Van Dusen Air, Inc. 210 the parties entered into a contract whereby
the defendant foreign corporation agreed to purchase 1000 aircraft
parts from a corporation in the forum state of Ohio. Due to the
substantial production of goods that would take place in Ohio, and
the active role taken by the defendant within the state in negotiations and inspection of the seller's plant, the court held that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable. In reaching
this conclusion, the court formulated an approach which insures
205. McQuay v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 906 (D. Minn.
1971); accord, Guardian Packaging Corp. v. Kapak Ind. Inc., 316 F. Supp.
952 (D. Minn. 1970); Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp., 72
Mass. 601, 280 N.W.2d 423 (1972).
206. E.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220,
232 (6th Cir. 1968); Geneva Ind., Inc. v. Copeland Construction Corp., 312
F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Il. 1970).
207. 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974).
208. Id. at 18, 308 N.E.2d at 80.
209. E.g., Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971);
Seilon, Inc. v. Brema, S. p. A., 271 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Electronic
Manufacturing Corp. v. Trion, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ind. 1962). Cf.,
Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 8D 111. App. 2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (1967).
210. 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
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that the foreign corporation which purchases goods in the forum
state will receive reasonable treatment in jurisdictional questions:
The mere fact that a buyer is the defendant in a long-arm
situation should not preclude an assertion of jurisdiction
over such defendant, however. (Citations omitted.) To
the extent the buyer vigorously negotiates, perhaps dictates, contract terms, inspects production facilities and
otherwise departs from the passive buyer role it seems that
any unfairness which would normally be associated with
11
the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over him disappears.
Since the basic test of due process is that of fundamental fairness
to the parties, and since the approach in In-Flight Devices provides
the necessary flexibility to determine whether such a test is satisfied, it would seem wise for Pennsylvania to adopt this approach.
If the new long-arm statute is to extend as far as the limits of
due process, it is necessary that the courts recognize the isolated
contract as a basis of jurisdiction. 212 But a determination of the
"minimum contracts" needed in conjunction with the single contract
is not an easy task. More so than with the isolated tort situation, it
is important to consider each case on its facts taking into account
the nature and quality of the corporation's contacts with the forum
state necessitated by the creation and performance of the contract.
As shown in this analysis, decisions from other jurisdictions will
211.

Id. at 233.

212.

In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.

Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974), a case decided too late for inclusion in the
text of this article, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a single
contract with a Pennsylvania resident was sufficient to subject a Georgia
corporation to suit in Pennsylvania. The defendant corporation contracted
with a Pennsylvania company for the purchase of some lumber drying
equipment. Alleging that the equipment was defective, the defendant refused to pay the full purchase price. The defendant had minimal commercial ties with Pennsylvania. Specifically, the defendant had no offices or
agents in Pennsylvania, and with the exception of the transaction in question, had not been engaged in any business contacts with Pennsylvania.
In analyzing the problem of whether this single contract was a sufficient
nexus for jurisdictional purposes, the court employed the three step analysis of Southern Machine:
However, we find certain guidelines which aid in the factual anal-

ysis necessary to make the determination of whether the requisite
"minimum contacts" are present in a given case. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws . .. Secondly, the cause of action must arise
from defendant's activities within the forum state .

.

. Lastly, the

acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection
with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it
reasonable.
Id. at 19, 323 A.2d at 15. Applying these three criteria, the court held that
the defendant had been "doing business" within the state and thus was
subject to its jurisdiction.

provide valuable precedent for the Pennsylvania courts as they
grapple with similar situations under the new long-arm statute.
CONCLUSION

In adopting its new long-arm statute, Pennsylvania has finally
come to recognize the commercial realities that prompted the Supreme Court to expand the scope of state jurisdiction in International Shoe and its progeny. In a modern business world where
large corporations abound, spreading their activities and products
throughout the entire nation, Pennsylvania had steadfastly clung to
the outmoded concept that jurisdiction could not be predicated on
the single act of a foreign corporation. Now, if given the proper
expansive interpretation by the courts, the new Pennsylvania longarm statute can effectively make foreign corporations amenable to
suit in cases involving a single tort or contract. Although the statute has retained the traditional "doing business" test as the basis
of jurisdiction, its stated purpose is to extend jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the limits allowed by due process. Therefore,
in order to be consistent with the intent of the legislature, the
definition of "doing business" should be expanded to include all corporate activities which are sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" test. 213 In applying the statute, the courts of Pennsylvania
will necessarily have to accept the position adopted in other states,
predithat jurisdiction can be obtained over a foreign corporation
214
cated on a single act, most notably a tort or contract.
WILLIAM

213. See note 109a supra.
214. See note 212 supra.
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